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Abstract 
We propose in this paper an on-line algorithm based on Bloom filters to detect port scan attacks 
in IP traffic. Only relevant information about destination IP addresses and destination ports are 
stored in two steps in a two-dimensional Bloom filter. This algorithm can be indefinitely 
performed on a real traffic stream thanks to a new adaptive refreshing scheme that closely 
follows traffic variations. It is a scalable algorithm able to deal with IP traffic at a very high bit 
rate thanks to the use of hashing functions over a sliding window. Moreover it does not need any 
a priori knowledge about traffic characteristics. When tested against real IP traffic, the proposed 
on-line algorithm performs well in the sense that it detects all the port scan attacks within a very 
short response time of only 10 seconds without any false positive. 
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We address in this paper the problem of designing an on-line algorithm for identifying port 
scan attacks in IP traffic. A port scan is a method of determining whether particular services are 
available on a host or a network by observing responses to connection attempts (Devivo, 1999). 
The received information are exploited to identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the host and 
to launch therefore more serious attacks. Several attack tools are now available and can easily be 
used (see (Nmap), (Foundstone) and (Nessus)) Port scan can be launched from one or several 
sources. In this latter case, we are dealing with distributed attacks, which are more difficult to 
detect as the contribution of each source can be considered as legitimate traffic. According to 
(Staniford, 2002) port scan attacks can be classified into two categories: 
1. Vertical scan consisting of scanning to big number of destination ports for a single 
destination address. 
2. Horizontal scan when many IP addresses are scanned (generally within the same subnet), 
on one or several ports. 
 
Related works 
Many port scan detecting methods had been developed in the literature. In (Monowar, 
2010) Monowar et al. provide a survey on a large number of detection approaches. They 
classified them into many types (algorithmic, threshold-based, soft computing, rule-based, and 
visual approaches). They also established a comparison based on type, mode of detection and 
accuracy of the algorithms. Their main conclusion is that methods combining data mining and 
threshold-based analysis are the most efficient in terms of false positive rates, scalability and 
robustness. Most of detection approaches are single source and can not detect distributed attacks 
(e.g. (Robertson, 2003) , (Roesch, 1999)). Very few methods can be applied on-line and give real 
time response. Moreover a common weakness of port scan detecting methods, particularly the 
threshold-based methods, is that their accuracy is closely dependent on traffic characteristics. 
Quite often, algorithms depend on constants directly related to the traffic intensity. For a limited 
set of traces, they can be tuned by hand to get reasonable performances. This procedure is, 
however, not acceptable in the context of an operational network. As a general requirement, it is 
highly desirable that the constants used by algorithms automatically adapt, as simply as possible, 
to varying traffic conditions. As an example, in (Heberlein, 1990) Heberlein et al. propose an 
IDS (Intrusion Detection System) where a source is considered as malicious if it contacts more 
than 15 other IP addresses in a given time window. 
 
In this paper we focus on vertical port scan where many ports are scanned for a given 
destination address. Our objective is to design an adaptive algorithm that detects on-line this kind 
of attacks. The algorithm will be deployed on operators IP backbone network carrying traffic at a 
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very high bit rate. At this level one can have an aggregated view of the global traffic (generated 
by many hosts) which is very useful to detect attacks. Moreover at this level, network operator 
can stop the attack to avoid its propagation until the destination and therefore save network 
resources. An on-line analysis of IP traffic in the core network is a challenging issue. The 
algorithm has to perform a very quick data processing and to store only relevant information. 
Data analysis should be faster than the arrival rate of data stream of a real-time execution. So the 
processing time of a packet has to be lower than the inter-arrival packets time which is of the 
order of few nanoseconds. This is typically a context of data mining. 
 
A natural solution to cope with the huge amount of data in IP traffic is to use hash tables. A 
data structure using hash tables, a Bloom filter, proposed by B. Bloom (Bloom, 1970) in 1970, 
has been used to test whether an element is a member of a given set. Bloom filters have been 
used in various domains : In (McIlroy, 1982) and (Mullin & Margoliash, 1990) they are used to 
represent words of a dictionary with a small memory. They make the search in the dictionary 
much faster. Bloom filters are also very useful for some distributed database applications. With a 
simple representation of a table content in a Bloom filter, we can speed up significantly semi-join 
operations and reduce the overhead communication between machines as they only exchange 
Bloom filters (see (Bratbergsengen, 1984) and (Mullin, 1990)). Many distributed network 
applications rely on Bloom filters to improve their performance. We can for example mention 
the distributed web cache sharing proposed by Fan et al. in (Fan, 2000) or the detecting loops 
algorithm introduced by Whitaker and Wetherall (Whitaker, 2002), in the context of packet 
switching. Bloom filters are well adapted to many other applications such as multicast (Gronvall, 
2002) resource routing in peer-to-peer networks (Druschel, 2001), (Stoica, 2001) and queue 
management  (Dilip, 2001). 
Bloom filters have been used by Estan and Varghese (Estan, 2002) to detect large flows. A 
Bloom filter consists of k tables of counters indexed by k hash functions. The general principle is 
the following : for each table, the flow ID of a given packet (that is the addresses and port 
numbers of the source and the destination) is hashed onto some entry and the corresponding 
counter is incremented by 1. Ideally, as soon as a counter exceeds the value C, it should be 
concluded that the corresponding flow has more than C packets. Unfortunately, since there is a 
huge number of small flows, it is very likely for instance that a significant fraction (i.e. more 
than C for example) of them will have the same entry, incrementing the same counter, thereby 
creating a false large flow. To avoid this problem, Estan and Varghese (Estan, 2002) propose to 
periodically erase all counters. Without any a priori knowledge on traffic (intensity, flow arriving 
rate, etc.), which is usually the case in practical situations, the erasure frequency can be either 
 
1. too low, and, in this case, the filters can be saturated : Because of the large number of 
small flows, many of them may be hashed on the same entry of the hash table and, 
therefore, the corresponding counter is increased accordingly, and consequently creating 
a false large flow.  
 
2. too high and a significant fraction of large flows can be missed in this case : Indeed, the 
value of the counter of a given entry corresponding to a large flow with a low throughput 
may not reach the value C if the value of this entry is set to 0 too often.  
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The efficiency of the algorithm is therefore highly dependent on the period !  of the 
erasure mechanism of the filters. This quantity is clearly related to the traffic intensity. 
 
Organization of the paper 
Starting from Estan and Varghese’s algorithm, we propose an adaptation to the context of 
port scan attacks. An algorithm based on Bloom filter with a new adaptive refreshment scheme is 
proposed. The organization of this paper is as follows: A detailed description of the algorithm 
detecting port scan is given in the next section. The algorithm proposed is tested against 
experimental data collected from IP backbone network in the third Section. Concluding remarks 
are presented in the last section. 
 
ALGORITHMS WITH BLOOM FILTER 
In this section, we describe our new algorithm designed to identify on-line port scan attacks 
in the Internet IP traffic. According to the port scan definition given above, the number of 
different destination ports per destination address is an excellent observable to control in order to 
detect this kind of attacks. That is why the proposed algorithm is based on an on-line counting of 
the number of distinct destination ports used for each destination address. 
 
Let us first define the flow as the set of the those packets with the same destination address. 
The flow size is then naturally defined as the number of different destination ports used during a 
given time window ! . Hence the objective of the algorithm is to identify flows which get 
“much” larger than the others. 
 
The algorithm is divided into two parts: 
1. The counting mechanism: In this part IP traffic is filtered and only significant 
observables for port scan detection are stored.  
2. The decisional module: The objective of this part is to detect automatically suspicious 
behavior in the filtered data derived from the counting mechanism.  
 
The problem of on-line counting the number of distinct elements (cardinality) in a given set 
has been already addressed in the literature. One can mention the Probabilistic counting and the 
Hyperloglog algorithms proposed by Flajolet et al. (Flajolet, 2007), (Flajolet, 1985) or the 
minCount algorithm of Giroire and Fusy (Giroire, 2007). These are very efficient algorithms in 
term of memory usage and speed. Unfortunately, they are not adapted to our context as one has 
to run them for each destination address, which is unrealistic given the potential number of 
destination addresses, especially with the transition to IPv6. 
 
The specificity of the port scan detection problem is that the counting mechanism has to be 
performed for each destination address. This brings an additional difficulty compared to the 
classical counting problems. The proposed solution is based on an improvement of Bloom filter 
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Counting with Bloom filter 
The starting point is the algorithm based on Bloom filters designed by Estan and Varghese 
(Estan, 2002). The objective of this algorithm is to identify flows with more than C packets, 
called large flows. Notice that flows size is in this context simply defined as its total packets 
number. The filter, see Figure 1, consists of k stages. Each stage i contains m counters taking 
values from 0 to C. It is assumed that k independent hash functions h1, h2. . . , hk are available. 
The total size of the memory used for the filter is denoted by M, recall that M should be of the 
order of several Mega-Bytes. An additional auxiliary memory is used to store the identifiers of 
detected large flows. 
 
Figure 1. A Bloom filter 
 
The algorithm works as follows: All counters are initially set equal to 0; if a packet 
belonging to a flow A is received then: 
• If A is already registered in the memory storing large flows IDs then next packet is 
considered.  
• If not, let min(A) the minimum value of the counters at the entries h1(A), . . . , hk(A) of the 
k hash tables.  
o If (min(A) < C), all the corresponding counters having the value min(A) are 
incremented by 1. 
o If (min(A) = C), the flow of A is added to the memory storing large flows IDs. 
The flow is detected as a large flow.  
 
The algorithm as such is of course not complete since small flows can be mapped repeatedly to 
the same entries and create false large flows. This is the classical problem of collisions in the 
context of Bloom filters. One has therefore to clear the filters from the influence of these 
undesirable flows. Estan and Varghese (Estan, 2002) proposed to erase all counters of the filters 
on a periodic basis (5 seconds in their paper): 
 
Estan and Varghese’s refreshing mechanism: 
 
• Every !  time units all counters are re-initialized to 0.  
 
Ideally, the constant !  should be directly related to the traffic intensity. On the one hand, if 
the refreshment mechanism occurs frequently, the counters corresponding to real large flows are 
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decreased too often and a significant fraction of them may not reach the value C and therefore 
many large flows will be missed. On the other hand, if !  is too large then, because of their huge 
number, small flows may be mapped onto the same entry and would increase the corresponding 
counter to the value C, creating a false large flow. This periodic refreshing mechanism could 
perfectly work if there would be a way to change the value of !  according to the order of 
magnitude of the number of small flows. Such a scheme is however not easy to implement in 
practice. 
 
In (Chabchoub, 2009), a Bloom filter associated to k hash functions is used to identify 
large flows, in a different way: For each received packet, only one counter, chosen at random 
among the smallest counters, is incremented by 1. A new refreshing mechanism is also 
introduced. It consists of decrementing periodically all positive counters by one. The objective is 
to eliminate progressively small flows without damaging large ones. In fact the bound between 
small and large flows is very thin: more or less than C packets.  
In the context of attacks detection, we aim intuitively to erase all flows related to standard traffic 
in order to keep only very large flows that are very likely to correspond to some attacks. As there 
is a significant difference between these two kinds of flows, we can apply a more aggressive 
refreshing mechanism on the filter. 
 
We propose in the next subsection a new adaptive refreshing mechanism that needs no a 
priori knowledge about traffic characteristics and that automatically varies according to traffic 
intensity. 
Estan and Varghese’s algorithm cannot be directly applied to the port scan detection 
problem. In fact, for a given flow, only packets having a new destination port number should be 
counted (cf flow size definition given before). This means that, for each flow one has to store 
already used destination port numbers. 
 
 
Figure 2. Counting flows sizes with a Bloom filter matrix 
Thus the filter is modified as follows, see Figure 2:  
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The filter ( )
ij
F  consists of 162m!  matrix of bits where {0,1}ijF ! . A table T  of m  counters is 
also added. 
i








=! .  
The counting mechanism is performed as follows: All counters are initially equal to 0. If a 
packet belonging to a flow A , with a destination port P  is received then ( )
ij
F  and T  are 
adapted in the following way: 
• The cell 
ij
F , where ( )i h A=  and j P= , is considered. If ( 0)ijF =  then  
o 1
ij
F =   
o 1
i i
T T= +   
 
Notice that Estan and Varghese (Estan, 2002) algorithm uses k hashing functions in order 
to reduce the impact of collisions consisting of mapping several flows to the same counter via a 
given hashing function. Consequently this counter over estimates flows size. In the context of the 
port scan detection algorithm, the size of a flow A can be over estimated if and only if these two 
conditions are satisfied: 
 
1. A collides with an other flow B; (h(A) = h(B)) 
2. A and B have different destination ports 
 
In practice this is an unusual situation as the commonly used destination ports are not very 
numerous, even if the number of different ports can theoretically reach 65,536 as a port number 
is encoded on two bytes. Moreover, for the port scan detection problem one does not focus on an 
exact estimation of flows sizes but only on identifying very large flows. So unlike for Estan and 
Varghese, this new context is much less sensitive to the problem of collisions. That is why we 
prefer saving memory by using only one hash function in our algorithm. 
 
Adaptive Refreshing Mechanism 
The presented algorithm cannot run indefinitely. In fact flows have a limited lifetime and 
ideally old flows have to be erased from the filter to keep an efficient counting mechanism. So 
the filter needs to be sometimes refreshed. The general principle is the following: If the state of 
filter is declared as overloaded then all the cells in the filter ( )
ij
F  and in the summation table T 
are reinitialized to 0. 
The following “RATIO” criterion is proposed to declare the state of the filter as 
overloaded: 
Let us define r as the proportion of non-null counters in the summation table T; the filter is 
overloaded when r is above some threshold R. This refreshing mechanism is clearly adaptive as 
its frequency only depends on traffic variations: As long as the state of the filter is not 
overloaded, nothing occurs and if there is a peak of activity, the filter gets quite quickly filled 
and the refreshment mechanism is automatically executed. More precisely, as R is computed on 
the table T and not globally for the filter, the peak of activity consists of a big number of 
destination addresses received in a short time window. Notice that the occurrence of a vertical 
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port scan (where only one destination address is involved) has no impact on the refreshing 
frequency. This is very important to could detect the attack. 
 
The key parameter of this refreshing mechanism is the filling up threshold R. It is a very 
sensitive parameter for the algorithm. For a fixed m (size of the summation table T), there is 
clearly a trade-off in the choice of the value of R: On the one hand, with a small R, collisions will 
be minimized so the counting mechanism will be more accurate. But on the hand, if we refresh 
the filter too frequently (lets say every second), the impact of a port scan attack on the traffic 
characteristics can not be seen as the attack will be fractionated over many sliding windows. An 
intermediate solution is to fix R in an initialization step of the algorithm as follows: R is the 
filling up rate reached after a given duration !. It is a variable threshold depending on the traffic 
type considered. In practice ! is set to one minute, which is a reasonable duration given that a 
port scan attack lasts several minutes. 
 
The attacks detection mechanism 
As explained above, the adaptive refreshing mechanism proposed gives an estimation of 
the number of different destination ports for each destination address over a sliding window of 
one minute. Recall that this observable is defined in the second section as flows size. The 
objective of the attacks detection mechanism is to identify “large” flows. The term “large” has to 
be properly defined. Roughly speaking, this means that such a flow is much larger than the other 
“normal” flows. Again, because of the variation of traffic, an adaptive scheme has to be devised 
to properly define these concepts. 
 
The main idea of the algorithm is to evaluate a varying average mn of the largest flow in 
several sliding time windows of length !. The quantity mn describes “normal flows”; it is 
periodically updated in order to adapt to varying traffic conditions. It is a weighted average that 
takes into account all its past values to follow carefully traffic variations but not too closely. If a 
flow in the n
th
 time window is much larger than mn!1, it is considered as an attack, and the 
moving average is not updated for this time window. 
 
The following variables are used: 
• As before, r is the proportion of non-zero counters in the summation table T. 
•  S is a multiplicative detection threshold. Roughly speaking, an attack is declared when 
an observation is S times greater than the “normal” behaviour. The value of S is fixed by 
the administrator.  
• Rs and R are thresholds for the variable r. The constant Rs is independent of traffic and 
taken once and for all equal to 90% and R is a variable threshold depending on the traffic 
type considered.  
• " is the updating coefficient for averages; " = 0.85 in our experiments.  
• ! is the duration of the initialization phase (1 minute in the paper). It is in fact a bound 
for the time before which an attack should be detected.  
• mn  is the weighted moving average for the n
th








• All counters in the filter matrix ( )
ij
F  and the summation table T  are set to 0 . 
• ( )
ij
F  and T  are progressively updated when packets are received  
After a duration ! , evaluate the variable r  
o If 
s
r R!  then :R r=  else :
s
R R= . 




m maxT i= . 
Detection phase: the thn  time window 
• At the beginning ( )
ij
F  and T  are initialized to 0 . 
• The Bloom filter is progressively updated with packets arrivals by using their destination 
address and destination port.  




, an attack is declared. 
If r R!  










         
1 (1 )maxn n nm m! !"= + "  
o Start the ( 1)n + th time window. 
 
 
Table 1. Algorithm for port scan detection  
The algorithm starts with an initialization phase of length ! in order to evaluate the 
threshold R. At the end of this phase, R will be definitively fixed for the rest of the experiment. 
In addition, as this phase corresponds to the first time window, the moving average m1 will be 
initialized as the biggest counter obtained. We implicitly assume that there is no attack during the 
initialization phase. See Table 1 for the description of the algorithm. 
 
Note that an alarm is declared during the n
th
 time window as soon as the value of a counter 
becomes greater than Smn. In this case the moving weighted average mn is not updated, it keeps 
its old value, computed in the previous time windows. Both attacker and victim can be identified 
as the attack is always raised by the last performed packet and we can simply store and update 
the IP header of the last received packet. 
 
At the beginning, the first time window is fixed (its duration is !) but, since the evolution 
depends on the occupation rate of the summation table T, the duration of the other time windows 
is variable. If traffic characteristics are not much varying, time windows duration remain around 
one minute. In this case, an attack is detected at the latest after one minute so that the network 









To evaluate and validate the attack detection algorithm described in the previous section, 
we run experiments on a traffic trace captured in the IP backbone network of Orange Labs in 
December 2007 in the context of the ANR-RNRT OSCAR project. This traffic trace contains 
some port scan attacks. Its global characteristics are given in Table 2. 
 
 
Nb. IP packets Duration Nb. Flows 
6




Table 2. Characteristics of the traffic used for attack detection 
A simple analysis of the trace shows that the global characteristics of the traffic (rate, 
number of flows per minute) do not vary too much (see Figure 3 and 4). Thus Port scan attacks 




Figure 3. Total packets number per minute   Figure 4. Total flows number per minute 
 
More specific experiments at flow level are performed in Figure 5 to identify port scan 
attacks. Recall that a flow is defined as a set of packets with the same destination address. Figure 
5 shows the real size of the largest flow (i.e. the number of its different destination ports) in a 
sliding window of one minute. Notice that these experiments are done off-line. They are based 
on an exhaustive exact counting, which is unrealistic in an on-line context. According to this 
figure, the largest flow has about 150 different destination ports. This size has also a small 
variance. But one can clearly detect two peaks, which correspond to two port scan attacks. They 
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 minute. The attacked address is 10.0.0.3 in the two cases. This address 
has up to 6000 different destination ports per minute. The used destination ports are mainly 
composed of the so-called in (Devivo, 1999) Well Known Ports (0-1023) and some Registered 
Ports (1024-49151). 
 
Figure 5. Size of the largest flow per minute (2 port scan attacks against 10.0.0.3) 
 
Flow experiments and performance analysis 
 
Figure 6. Detected attacks with m =1024, S =2 
Figure 6 shows the results of the proposed algorithm on the traffic trace. The size m of the 
summation table T is taken equal to 1024. So the total size of the Bloom filter matrix is equal to 
67 MB. After the initialization phase of one minute, the filling up reached 47%, and the 
parameter R is fixed to this value. The multiplicative detection threshold S is set to 2. The choice 
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of this value is mainly based on the small variance of the largest flow size showed before. One 
can see in Figure 6 that the moving weighted average mn is always close to the real size of the 
largest flow except in case of attacks. In fact when attacks occur, mn is not updated for the 
current time window and all packets addressed to the attacked destination are no more inserted 
into the Bloom filter until the end of the attack. This avoids overloading the filter with useless 
information. The moving average mn is therefore updated in the following window. Thus the 
attack has no impact on mn and the algorithm is able to deal with several simultaneous attacks. 
 
Moreover our algorithm is very reactive and has a very short response time as it detects the 
attacks in the first 10 seconds. Let us recall that the algorithm raises an alarm as soon as a 
counter in T becomes too high compared to mn. It means that is does not wait the end of the time 
window to declare the attack. 
Notice finally that this algorithm can be easily implemented on a core router as its total 
required memory is less than 100MB and it is well adapted to an on-line analysis. The counting 
mechanism used in the proposed algorithm gives an estimation of the size of the largest flow. 
More precisely, it can over estimate the real size because of collisions in the bloom filter. As the 
objective is the identification of very large flows, the counting mechanism has not to be “too” 
accurate. But the overestimation can also lead to some false positives (false raised alarms) 




Figure 7. Impact of m on the counting mechanism accuracy 
In Figure 7 the relative error on the estimation of the largest flow is plotted for different 
values of R. The value of R is automatically fixed after the initialization phase of one minute. 
Therefore it only depends on the size of the filter m. Three values of m are tested (256, 1024 and 
4096). The algorithm gives no false positives in the three cases. It is clear that the estimation is 
more accurate for small values of R. But, a static highest filling up threshold Rs must be defined 
to limit the impact of the over estimation. Rs is taken to 90%. 
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The proposed algorithm can also deal with slow port scan attacks. In this case the attack is 
performed progressively by adding a small number of destination ports each time (see (Dabbagh, 
2011) for more details). The weakness of the threshold-based algorithms is that they can miss the 
attack if the attacker is just below the threshold. To detect slow port scan attacks, one has to 
consider a larger time scale and a more aggregated traffic. More precisely, two Bloom filters will 
be used and two time windows will be considered: !1 = 1 minute and !2 = 5 minutes. The 
algorithm will be performed separately for these two Bloom filters which are totally independent. 
Each packet will be registered twice in the two filters, and slow attacks will be only identified 
using !2. The required resources (memory and processing capacity) are obviously doubled but 
the algorithm can still be implemented on a standard router for an online analysis. 
 
Remark on threshold 
The algorithm uses the variable S, called the multiplicative detection threshold. It is related 
to the network administrator’s decision about the precise definition of an anomalous behaviour. 
In the experiments, there is a set of events which will be qualified as “attacks” for a smaller 
values of S. Note however that, for some large but “milder” variations, the qualification as attack 
will depend on the particular value of this parameter. There is no way to avoid this situation in 





We have presented in this paper a novel adaptive algorithm for identifying vertical port 
scan attacks in Internet traffic. A new approach using a two-dimensional Bloom filter is 
developed. Unlike Estan and Varghese approach where the filter is periodically erased, we 
propose a new original ”RATIO” criteria to refresh the filter according to traffic intensity. The 
proposed algorithm has been successfully tested against a real traffic trace (captured in the IP 
backbone network of orange Labs) containing some port scan attacks. 
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